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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KUNZ & COMPANY, dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a
California corporation,
Case No. 970216-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 15

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

REPLY REGARDING STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 3 is, as to the specific factors the Court of
Appeals directed the District Court to consider, a question of
law.

Those factors are "actual land use" and whether the zoning

body perpetuated the prior zoning designation of Washington
County.

Kunz v. State. 913 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah App. 1996).

The

primacy of these factors is established by this Court's specific
identification of these factors, and by this Court's instruction
to the District Court to address them.
1

The consequence of the

District Court's failure to follow this Court's specific
directive is a question of law, reviewable without deference to
the District Court's determination.

Slattery v. Covey & Co.,

Inc.. 909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995).
Issue No. 4, relating to the District Court's explicit
disregard of the controlling section of law as essentially
unworkable, is also a question of law.

Id.

REPLY TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether the three
billboards are in an area "zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising."
(1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3)

But to decide that question, this Court directed the

District Court to consider "not just the stated purpose of the
zoning body" but certain specific factors.
769.

Kunz. 913 P.2d at

The only two factors this Court specifically required the

District Court to consider were "actual land use" and any
evidence the zoning body perpetuated the Washington County zoning
classification, which under Kunz would leave the area unlawful
for signs.

id.

Those two factors must, by virtue of their

specification, be the dominant considerations in deciding the

2

ultimate issue.

Those two factors are discussed in UDOT's

opening brief.
Less specifically, this Court directed consideration of all
evidence "relevant" to the ultimate question of whether the area
is within the phrase "areas zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 27-12136.3(3) (1995).

Id.

The most salient evidence to this end,

beyond the two primary factors just noted, is the evidence that
Mr. Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were on and the
person who would benefit financially by addition of the small
area of the signs to the area annexed and zoned commercial by
Toquerville in December of 1993, was the single moving force
without whom that particular portion of the annexed property
would not have been included in the Toquerville annexation and
zoning to commercial.

Appellant's Br. at 30-32.

This Eveleth

land that would not have been annexed and zoned commercial absent
Eveleth's involvement is in the aberrant bump at the top of the
map constituting Kunz's Addendum No. 5.
The tax revenues from the signs, the only commercial
enterprise there has ever been in this area, is also

3

significantly relevant.

This is so because this Court recognized

that "the legislature must have contemplated that local zoning
bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from lands
adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow outdoor
advertising" (Kunz. 913 P.2d at 769), and therefore directed the
District Court to look beyond "the stated purpose of the zoning
body or local government" to more objective factors.

Id.

The signs were illegal under the February, 1993 UDOT Remand
Order this Court held governed Kunz by res judicata, igi. at 769770.

That is relevant to counter Kunz's claim that the signs

were only "non-conforming" and not illegal,1 and hence need not
comply with Toquerville or State requirements for new signs.2 •

lM

The term 'illegally erected1 or 'illegally maintained1 is
not synonymous with the term, 'nonconforming sign', nor is a sign
with 'grandfather' status synonymous with the term,
'nonconforming sign.'" Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3(14) (1994).
2

UDOT can require Kunz to comply with the Toquerville
ordinance as well as State law as a condition to the issuance of
State sign permits based on a ruling of this Court in another
sign case:
The State certainly has inherent authority to identify
an existing requirement of law and make it a condition
to the granting of a permit or lease. The application
of an existing requirement of law is not equivalent to
imposing new conditions not otherwise required by law.

4

Kunz does not rebut the centrally relevant and dispositive
facts UDOT marshaled in its opening brief in support of the
conclusion that the area where the signs stood is within the
phrase, "areas zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising."

Kunz's brief does discuss why Toquerville did not

zone certain other areas commercial, but that is not the
question.

More generally, Kunz's brief rambles through large

amounts of matter irrelevant to the ultimate issue.
At page 4 of its brief, Kunz lumps Eveleth i11 with a group
of owners as initiators of the annexation.

That is an attempt to

gloss the specific testimony given by the annexing coordinator
that the request of Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were
on, was the reason for the annexation of that particular small
area and that without his request that portion would not have
been added.

(R. 855-56, 876; see also Appellant's Br. at 30-32).

Though Kunz showed that there had been some potential
interest in commercial development "of property right on the
Anderson Junction 1-15 Interchange," (Appellee's Br. at 4-5), it
did not show any "actual land use" as commercial.

Further, Kunz

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. ROA General, 927 P.2d 666, 668-69 (Utah
App. 1996).
5

failed to show any interest at all in commercial development in
the area where the signs are, 2,000 to 3,000 feet from the
interchange (R. 1024-25), up a rural frontage road.

(R. 1004).

Kunz claims that "a majority of town residents" and "most
residents" favored creation of a commercial zone.
at 5.

Appellee's Br.

There was, of course, no testimony from "a majority of

town residents" or "most residents."

Moreover, the record

references Kunz supplies do not show that any witness even says
that "a majority" or "most" residents favored such creation.
Further, Kunz's assertion, Appellee's Br. at 5, that owners of
property "on the intersection desired [a commercial] designation
to accommodate future commercial development plans, . . . and tax
base benefits" does not reasonably relate to the area of the
signs, the closest of which was 2,000 feet away. (R. 1024-25.)
Kunz concedes that the zoning designation of Washington
County was considered.

Appellee's Br. at 5.

The testimony of

Mayor Wahlquist goes much further and shows that Toquerville
perpetuated that designation,3 which this Court held was illegal
for signs based on the final UDOT Order on Remand.

3

R. 985; Appellant's Br. at 28.
6

Kunz, 913

P.2d 969-70.
The statement of Kunz that "there was never any discussion
of the outdoor advertising signs as justification for a Highway
Commercial (H.C.) Zoning designation" is typical of Kunz's
unsupported and unsupportable generalizations.
6.

Appellee's Br. at

The record reference Kunz supplies shows one person saying he

had not heard discussion of the signs at the meetings he
attended.
The supposed "fact" that "the current Toquerville zoning
ordinance did not address outdoor advertising specifically,"
Appellee's Br. at 6, is simply not a fact.

The Toquerville sign

ordinance was adopted in 1982 (R. 957), in effect at the time of
the Toquerville annexation and zoning (R. 984), placed into
evidence at the remand trial as Kunz•s Exhibit 2, and attached to
Kunz's brief as Addendum 6.

And that ordinance bars any sign

larger than 8 feet x 12 feet and any sign without a conditional
use permit.

There must have been some lapse in communication in

the portion of colloquy between Mr. Ronnow and the witness
reported at R. 911-12 with regard to the existence or nonexistence of a Toquerville sign ordinance.

7

This is shown later

in that colloquy where Mr. Ronnow himself refers that witness to
Toquerville1s "sign ordinance."

(R. 928, 11 2.)

What Kunz refers to as "the zoning map" (p. 6) was an
"interim zoning map" that was never formalized into a final
document.

(R. 981)

Kunz's characterization of the "SIGNS"

portion of the Toquerville ordinance is a completely nonsensical
blurring of what that sign ordinance plainly means.

The sign

ordinance (Appellee's Br., Addendum 6 at 29) reflects the
requirements for a sign in Toquerville.

These requirements are

that an advertising sign is limited to 8 x 12 feet in size and 18
feet in height, must have a conditional use permit, and is
limited to indirect lighting.

Mr. Ronnow and the witness

demonstrated their understanding that this ordinance requires a
conditional use permit, in the following exchange:
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Based on the H-C ordinance, the highway
commercial ordinance we've been discussing and
provisions therein, and the chapter 12 sign ordinance,
Toquerville's zoning ordinance that we're now
discussing, can an applicant seek a conditional use
permit in highway commercial for an advertising sign"
A. Yes, sir.
(R. 929, 11 9-15) .
The District Court was indisputably correct in its
8

recognition that it was the intent of the Toquerville sign
ordinance that "any signage of the type involved in this
litigation be permissible only by conditional use permit."

(R.

768, H 8 ) . The District Court was indisputably incorrect in
basing its judgment on the premise that conditional use permits
must have been obtained for the signs because placement of the
signs "could only be done by conditional use permit,"4 when no
evidence of conditional use permits had been submitted.
, REPLY TO CERTAIN ASSERTIONS IN KUNZ'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
UDOT replies here to some of Kunz's assertions in its
Summary of Arguments.

First, UDOT's brief marshals evidence in

its statement of facts and discussion of discrete issues.
Administrative Rule R933-2-3(4) (1994) clarifies Utah Code
Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) and makes an area illegal for
billboards where, as here, the "primary activity" on the land is
outdoor advertising.

This Court directed the District Court to

consider all relevant evidence bearing on whether the area is
zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and
Kunz approvingly quotes the District Court's declaration that its

4

(R. 769, I 10) .
9

inquiry was to have "extremely broad horizons."

(R. 842;

Appellee's Br. at 22). Thereupon Kunz submitted in evidence in
the remand trial and the District Court accepted, Kunz's Exhibit
2, the Toquerville ordinance, which had never been introduced
before in this case.

Now, Kunz objects to UDOT's submission, at

that same remand trial, of Administrative Rule R933-2-3(4) (1994)
and UDOT's argument thereon.

(R. 708-09.)

The administrative

rule is no less relevant than the Toquerville sign ordinance and
should not be excluded from consideration.
Kunz is incorrect that UDOT did not make this argument
regarding the rule, below.

(See R. 708--"R933-2-3(4) of the Utah

Administrative Code clarifies the definition in Utah Code Ann. §
27-12-136.3(3) (1995) that was otherwise considered ambiguous . .
. .")

This argument will be further developed below.

The list of "factors" Kunz claims the District Court
considered does not support the District Court's findings or
judgment.

This will be treated below.

The Court's reasoning did not logically support the
findings, and the relevant facts in the record require reversal.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS JUDGMENT ON THE
EXISTENCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS FOR THE
SIGNS, AND IN SO DOING COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR

Kunz refuses to acknowledge the fact that the trial court
gave as its reason for concluding that the signs were not in an
area zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising, "the fact that the placement of advertising signs
within the Eveleth property after Toquerville annexed and zoned
the subject property could only be done by conditional use
permit."

(R. 769, % 10). This finding is clear error and

invalidates the judgment.

First, such a fact has no bearing on

whether the signs are in an area zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising.
non-fact.

Second, the supposed "fact" is a

There was no evidence of conditional use permits for

the signs and there could not have been any because the signs
were in violation of the 8 x 12 foot size requirement of the
Toquerville ordinance.

Appellee's Br., Addendum 6.

The signs were illegal under the February 1993 UDOT Order on
Remand, by res judicata.

Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769.

The signs were

also "illegal and subject to removal" on a separate basis.

11

Id.

at 770.

As "illegal" signs, the signs were not "non-conforming"

and were subject to Toquerville's (and the State's) requirements
for new signs.5
Kunz's refusal to acknowledge the District Court's repeated
reference to the Toquerville ordinance's requirement of
"conditional use permits" for the signs as the basis for its
decision6 is a statement by Kunz that the sun is not shining
while it sees it shine.

This is a variation of Kunz's refusal to

acknowledge that Toquerville has a sign ordinance that requires
conditional use permits.

Kunz's counsel and witness know better:

MR. RONNOW:
Q: Based on the H-C ordinance, the highway
commercial ordinance we've been discussing and
provisions therein, and the chapter 12 sign ordinance,
Toquerville's zoning ordinance that we're now
discussing, can an applicant seek a conditional use
permit in highway commercial for an advertising sign?
A. Yes, sir.
R. 929, 11 9-15.

5

One cannot help but wonder whether the fact that
Toquerville's legal counsel has been a partner in the same firm
as that of Kunz's counsel from the time of the Toquerville
annexation and zoning to the present has anything to do with
Toquerville's lack of enforcement of the Toquerville sign
ordinance.
6

(R. 768-69, H1 8 and 10).
12

As noted above, the planner to whom Kunz refers at page 13,
Mr. Sizemore, apparently had some lapse in communication with
Kunz's counsel at the trial regarding the Toquerville sign
ordinance, for the irrefutable fact is that Toquerville did have
a sign ordinance.

(See Kunz's Exhibit 2 at trial and Addendum 6

attached to its brief.)

That there may have been an intention to

amend it (never implemented) (R. 933) does not cancel its
existence.

Again, Kunz focuses on reasons not to zone certain

other areas "commercial."

That does not rebut the evidence UDOT

marshaled in its opening brief showing that the area of the signs
is an area zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising.
II.

UDOT MARSHALED THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS

Issue No. 1 relates to the Court's reliance on a nonexistent fact, irrelevant to the ultimate issue.

It is

philosophically impossible for UDOT to prove a negative -- that
the fact does not exist.

All UDOT need do is show that the lower

court based its ruling on a supposed fact and then observe that
there is no evidence in the record of the existence of that fact.
Kunz has had its opportunity to show the existence of that fact
13

and has not done so.

The non-existent fact on which the court

rested was the supposed existence of conditional use permits for
the signs.

There being no evidence of such permits and such

evidence being irrelevant, the findings fail to "show that the
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is
supported by, the evidence,'" as required by Acton v. Deliran.
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).
As to issue No. 3, the trial court's entry of judgment
without regard to the specific factors the Court of Appeals
directed it to consider is a question of law.

Slattery v. Covey

& Co. . Inc. , 909 P. 2d 925 (Utah App. 1995) . UDOT has, in any
case, marshaled the evidence showing the trial court's clear
error in disregarding the dispositive evidence.

Issue No. 4, the

trial court's dismissal as impracticable of the statute this
Court identified as controlling, is a question of law.
III.

Id.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE R933-2-3(4) RENDERS THE AREA
IN QUESTION UNLAWFUL FOR SIGNS

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6 (1995) (unchanged in material
respects since the 1994 adoption of R933-2-3(4) (1994)) empowers
UDOT to make rules to "control" outdoor advertising and provide
"enforcement" of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
14

Pursuant to

that grant and the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, UDOT
adopted rule R933-2-3(4) (1994) of the Utah Administrative Code
after notice and opportunity for public comment and hearing.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-4 (1996 Supp.) and 63-46a-5 (1993).
R933-2-3(4) (1994) is a "legislative rule".7
has the same binding effect as a statute.

A "legislative rule

It binds members of

the public, the agency, and even the courts, in the sense that
courts must affirm a legislative rule as long as it represents a
valid exercise of agency authority."

Davis & Pierce, § 6.3.

The rule does not have any retroactive effect upon Kunz.
least from the time of the February, 1993 UDOT Order on Remand,
it has been illegal to have signs at the location in issue.
7

Many legislative rules "interpret" statutory
language, in the sense that they announce the
agency's construction of a statute it has
responsibility to administer. A rule that
performs that interpretative function is a
legislative rule rather than an interpretative
rule if the agency has the statutory authority to
promulgate a legislative rule and the agency
exercises that power. Some legislative rules go
much further than adopting a construction of a
statute, of course. Some legislative rules impose
new obligations through exercise of legislative
authority delegated by statute.

Kenneth C. Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law
Treatise. § 6.3 (3rd ed. 1994). (Hereafter Davis & Pierce).
15

At

Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769-70 (holding that "Kunz is bound by the UDOT
Order on Remand" and that the signs are "illegal").

The 1994

administrative rule was made after that 1993 UDOT Order holding
the signs unlawful and before Kunz obtained any valid permits (it
still has none), and therefore that rule does not retroactively
divest Kunz of any rights, including rights to sign permits.
UDOT did raise the "ambiguity" of the statute below. (R.
708-09.)

The ambiguity arises from the ellipsis in the phrase in

§ 27-12-136.3(3), "areas zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising."

To make the grammatical structure

complete one could read it "areas [that werel zoned . . . , " or
"areas [that are] zoned . . . "

If one reads it "areas [that are]

zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising,"
the focus shifts from any specific action that was taken when the
zoning was initiated and the time past when that occurred, to the
purpose presently served by the zoning and the present statutes.
Reading the phrase in this latter sense is consistent with the
Court of Appeals' directive to the lower court to consider
present "actual land uses" in its factual inquiry.

In view of

this ambiguity, UDOT appropriately adopted clarifying rule R933-

16

2-3(4), that recognizes both senses of the phrase, pursuant to
its statutory authority and duty.
Contrary to Kunz's assertion, the phraseology of the UDOT
Order on Remand was consistent with the latter sense of the
statute and the rule.

That phraseology is as follows: "[T]he

zoning as !commercial! is, 'for the primary purpose of allowing
outdoor advertising . . . ." (emphasis added.) (R. 215.)

And

UDOT has consistently so argued throughout the proceedings.
(See, e.g., R. 1054 -- the "actual land use . . . shows the
purpose served by the zoning.11)
Kunz argues that the rule contradicts the statute.

This is

not true; it clarified Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995).
At the very least, rule R933-2-3(4) can be taken as creating a
very strong presumption that where the primary (or even more,
only) activity on the land the signs are on is outdoor
advertising, that advertising is unlawful.

In view of the

argument Kunz makes in favor of a very broad scope of inquiry at
the remand trial and its introduction at the remand trial for the
first time of the Toquerville ordinance, administrative rule
R933-2-3(4) (1994) should be applied to perpetuate the

17

unlawfulness of this area for signs.
IV.

KUNZ MISSTATES THIS COURT'S REMAND INSTRUCTION,
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS DO
NOT SATISFY THAT INSTRUCTION, AND THE RECORD
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT

This Court's remand is not "in effect a mandate to review
the Toguerville planning process."

(Kunz's brief, p. 22.)

The

remand instruction is what it is, and is reported and matched to
the evidence in UDOT's opening brief.
UDOT never urged the lower court not to consider the factors
identified by this Court.

UDOT objected to evidence that arises

from certain unreliable circumstances and sources, based on law
it cited to the Court. (R. 737-40) .

The District Court having

admitted and considered Kunz's submissions, UDOT urges only that
its submissions and arguments be admitted and considered on a
level playing field.

The lower court's failure on remand to

follow a specific instruction of the remanding court is a breach
of the law of the case and is a question of law.
Covev & Co.. Inc., 909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995) .

Slattery v.
The District

Court's findings do not meet this Court's remand instructions and
the judgment should be reversed.
Whether the lower court received evidence and testimony
18

regarding a matter says nothing about whether the court genuinely
considered it.

That becomes apparent only in the court's

findings and conclusions.

UDOT's opening brief details the

dispositive omissions and flaws in those findings and
conclusions.

Kunz's factors A through G do not support the

District Court's findings or judgment.
A.

ANNEXATION AT EVELETH'S REQUEST.

There is no reference

in the District Court's findings to a petition for annexation.
The general existence of a petition is not relevant anyway.

What

is relevant about the annexation process, however, is that the
sole initiating force for adding the portion of land the signs
were on to the land originally proposed for annexation was Mr.
Eveleth, the owner of the land the signs were on and the lessor
of that portion to Kunz.

This is established by the specific and

uncontradicted testimony of Kimball Wallace, the Toquerville city
engineer, quoted and discussed in UDOT's opening brief.
Appellant's Br. at 30-32.

Without that Toquerville annexation,

the signs would be unlawful without more as part of Washington
County, under the UDOT Order on Remand this Court held bound Kunz
by res judicata.

Kunz, 913 P.2d 769.

19

B.

ACTUAL LAND USE/LACK OF COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

It was

patent error for the trial court to disregard as irrelevant
"actual land use," the first factor this Court directed the lower
court to consider.

Id.

Indeed, the most probative evidence

presented at the trial was the absence of any commercial
development (other than the signs) in the naturally beautiful
area of the signs.

Yet the trial court recited its findings of

fact and stated its conclusion of law before it made any
reference to actual land use.

(R. 1065-67).

And the after-

thought, hypothetical, reference the District Court did make to
actual land use renders it clear the court did not consider that
use in reaching its conclusion.

The record reflects that

reference as follows:
But if it were left to the Court to determine to
which use this property had been placed, the only
conclusion that the Court could come to on the basis of
this record is that the only use that this property has
ever had during the times pertinent 1987 to date has
been the maintenance of outdoor advertising.
(R. 1067-68, emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals identified the first factor for
consideration to be "actual land use," and then the lower court
says, "if it were left to the Court to determine to which use
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this property had been placed . . . ."
it.

There is no "if" about

That determination was left to the trial court, it was

central to disposition of the case, by this court's instruction,
it was disregarded by the lower court, and the lower court's
failure to rely on it is reversible error.
C.

"PROPOSED" LAND USES.

This Court directed consideration

of "actual land use," not "potential" land use.
at 769.

Kunz, 913 P.2d

In any event, there was no finding or even testimony to

the effect that anyone has ever had any interest in placing
commercial activity in the area of the signs, 2,000 to 3,000 feet
from the intersection.
D.

PERPETUATION OF WASHINGTON COUNTY ZONING DESIGNATION.

The District Court entered no finding regarding Toquerville's
perpetuation of the Washington County zoning, despite the Court
of Appeals' explicit indication that perpetuation of the
Washington County zoning, under which the area was illegal for
signs, was a factor to consider.

Id.

UDOT has taken the

position that the District Court did not need further evidence on
the question whether Toquerville perpetuated the Washington
County zoning that was illegal for signs, because this Court has
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already found that "Toquerville . . . chose to retain the
'highway commercial' zoning for the area."

id. at 767.

However,

if the further evidence received on that factor is considered
necessary or useful, it further supports the conclusion that
Toquerville perpetuated Washington County's zoning.
Mr. Peterson may not have been aware of the Washington
County zoning, but the Toquerville Planner, Mr. Sizemore, was
aware of it. (R. 892, 902). Most significantly, the only witness
who actually voted on the Toquerville zoning, Mayor Wahlquist,
testified that "Toquerville left the zoning of the Eveleth land
the signs are on just as it was when the land was only in the
county."

(R. 985; Appellant's Br. at 26-30).

This perpetuation

of the Washington County zoning that was unlawful for signs
supports unlawfulness of the area for signs.
E.

NO UTILITIES OR INFRASTRUCTURE.

The District Court did

find there was no utility or infrastructure in the area of the
signs.

(R. 768, f 5 -- "There is no evidence of any utility ever

servicing the property - water, power, gas, sanitary sewer or
other utilities").

This finding is supported by the record and

supports the conclusion the zoning was not for commerce other
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than the signs.

The District Court inexplicably considered that

irrelevant, tossing it off as an after-thought, after already
having rendered its legal conclusion.
F.

SIGNAGE ISSUES.

(R. 1067).

The relevant aspects of the signage

issues, that show illegality of the signs, are discussed in
UDOT's opening brief.

Again, Toquerville did have a sign

ordinance at the time of the annexation and zoning.

Appellee's

Br., Addendum 6.
G.

LACK OF EVIDENCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS UNDER

TOQUERVILLE ORDINANCE.

The finding upon which the District Court

based its judgment -- that Toquerville must have issued
conditional use permits for the signs because the Toquerville
ordinance required conditional use permits for signs of this type
-- was based on thin air.

There was no evidence of any

conditional use permits since none had ever been issued.
Appellant's Reply Br. at 6-7, 11-13.

Moreover, this factor is

irrelevant to the ultimate issue.
CONCLUSION
The central finding of the trial court based on nonexistent
Toquerville conditional use permits is clearly erroneous. The
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findings of the trial court are erroneous as a matter of law as
to those factors it failed to consider in disregard of this
Court's explicit instructions. The findings do not show that the
trial court's judgment follows logically from and is supported by
the evidence, and therefore the judgment should be reversed.

The

record reflects that the immediate area of the sign, as an area
that is zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising, is not part of a "commercial or industrial zone"
under the statute or rule, and outdoor advertising in that area
is therefore unlawful.
DATED this < H

This Court should so hold.
day of August, 1997.

RALPH L. FINLAYSON
*
Assistant Attorney General
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